Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML): Typologies, Red Flags & Detection
Trade-based money laundering uses the movement of goods and the paperwork around it to move criminal money across borders. This guide explains the main techniques, the published red flags and how to escalate them. It draws on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Egmont Group, the Wolfsberg Group, the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
TBML is hard to detect because each party sees only part of a transaction. A bank sees the payment, a customs authority sees the goods, and a freight forwarder sees the shipment. The red flags below are the points where the parts do not fit together.
This guide is for compliance teams at banks and payment firms. It is also for fund managers, lenders and administrators exposed to trading companies, for example through trade finance or private credit funds and portfolio companies. TBML can be used to layer and integrate criminal proceeds. The 2020 FATF–Egmont report gives particular attention to its use for integrating illicit cash; see our guide to the stages of money laundering.
What TBML Is, and What It Is Not
The FATF's 2006 study identified three main ways criminals move money: through the financial system, through the physical movement of cash (for example by cash couriers), and through the movement of goods in the trade system. TBML is the third.
The FATF and the Egmont Group's December 2020 report stresses that the aim of TBML, unlike trade-related predicate offences, "is not the movement of goods, but rather the movement of money". The trade is a cover for the transfer of value. The same report defines trade-based terrorist financing as disguising the movement of value through trade "in an attempt to finance terrorism, whether from legitimate or illegitimate sources".
The Four Core TBML Techniques
The 2020 report describes four techniques that it traces to the 2006 study. Real schemes often combine several of them.
Over- and under-invoicing
The price on the invoice is set above or below the real value. Over-invoicing moves value from the importer to the exporter; under-invoicing moves it the other way. Both rely on the importer and exporter colluding.
Over- and under-shipment
The quantity shipped differs from the quantity invoiced and paid for. The extreme case is a "phantom shipment", where no goods move at all and the documents are fabricated.
Multiple invoicing
The same shipment is invoiced more than once, often through different banks, so that several payments can be justified by one movement of goods.
Falsely described goods and services
The type or quality of the goods differs from the documents, for example cheap goods described as high-value ones. The 2020 report also notes service-based money laundering, which exploits trade in services and other intangibles.
Why TBML Is Hard to Detect
- Open account trade. The Trade Finance Principles (2019) of the Wolfsberg Group, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Bankers Association for Finance and Trade (BAFT) say open account trade accounts for approximately 80% of all international trade. In open account trade the bank does not see the trade documents and can usually do no more than standard anti-money laundering (AML) and sanctions screening on the payment.
- Pricing is hard to judge. The Wolfsberg, ICC and BAFT Trade Finance Principles say banks "are not generally equipped" to decide whether goods are over- or under-invoiced.
- Data sits with others. The FATF–Egmont indicators note that, because many indicators depend on external data, "the private sector will not observe all of the indicators".
- Volumes are hard to measure. In the 2020 report, jurisdictions reported difficulty in producing even an indicative estimate of the value of their TBML exposure.
These limits shape what a firm can reasonably be expected to do: know its customers well, check what it can see, and escalate patterns that do not fit.
TBML Red Flags: The FATF–Egmont Risk Indicators
On 11 March 2021 the FATF and the Egmont Group published a list of TBML risk indicators, 35 in all on our count, grouped in four categories.
| FATF–Egmont category | What it covers | Example indicators |
|---|---|---|
| Structural (12 indicators on our count) | How the trading entity is set up and run | Unusually complex and illogical corporate structure, including shell companies or companies in high-risk jurisdictions; registration at a mass registration address; owners or managers who appear to be nominees concealing the beneficial owners; minimal staff for the volume traded; unexplained periods of dormancy |
| Trade activity (7) | Whether the trade makes commercial sense | Trade inconsistent with the stated line of business, such as a car dealer exporting clothing; letters of credit used for unusually long or frequently extended periods; consistently and unreasonably low profit margins; a newly formed or recently re-activated entity doing high-volume, high-value trade |
| Trade document and commodity (8) | Whether the paperwork and goods are consistent | Inconsistencies across contracts, invoices and other documents, such as the exporter differing from the payee; vague descriptions of goods; documents that are missing, appear counterfeit, were previously rejected or are frequently amended; shipments routed through several jurisdictions without justification |
| Account and transaction activity (8) | How the money moves | Very late changes to payment arrangements, such as redirecting payment to a previously unknown entity; "pay-through" accounts with rapid high-volume flows and small balances; payment by an entity other than the consignee without a clear reason; funds routed in a circle back to the country of origin |
The list is not exhaustive: the report says "by no means is this a conclusive list". Firms should add indicators from their own cases and products.
Document and Shipping Red Flags
Where a firm sees trade documents, as in documentary credits and collections, the documents themselves carry red flags. Regulators and industry bodies have published these examples:
| Source | Document and shipping red flags it lists |
|---|---|
| MAS Information Paper (October 2015, para 2.41) | Financing tenor not in line with the nature of the commodity; quantity exceeding the known capacity of the container or tanker; a bill of lading for containerised cargo with no container numbers; a future-dated bill of lading |
| Wolfsberg, ICC and BAFT Trade Finance Principles (2019 amendment, Appendix I) | Transactions beyond the capacity or substance of the customer; blatant anomalies in value against quantity; last-minute changes to payment instructions; documentary credits constantly amended or extended; goods descriptions that differ significantly, especially invoice against shipping document |
| FinCEN Advisory FIN-2010-A001 | Significant discrepancies between the goods described on the bill of lading, the invoice and other documents; amended letters of credit without reasonable justification; a customer unable to produce appropriate documents such as invoices |
| FCA TR13/3 (2013; the FCA now marks this review as historical) | Red flags that trade processing staff at the banks visited were considering included continuous container numbers on a bill of lading, port descriptions such as "any safe world port", and a beneficiary and applicant that appear to be group companies |
In Singapore, the AML/CFT Industry Partnership (ACIP) Best Practices for Countering Trade Based Money Laundering (May 2018) say banks "should document and maintain a list of red flags and case studies" that apply to their own trade finance business (s.4.1).
Payment and Account Red Flags
Payment red flags matter most for firms that see only the money, such as banks processing open account trade. FinCEN's TBML advisory FIN-2010-A001 lists, among others:
- Third-party payments for goods or services made by an intermediary apparently unrelated to the seller or purchaser.
- Funds transferred into domestic accounts and then transferred out in the same or nearly the same amounts.
- Sudden onset and equally sudden cessation of payments.
FinCEN's August 2025 advisory on Chinese money laundering networks (FIN-2025-A003) adds red flags for trade-based schemes. In the context of these networks, one example is a business that regularly receives wire transfers indicating the export of goods (for example to Mexico, China, Hong Kong or the UAE). The same business rarely, or never, makes payments that indicate the purchase of goods to maintain inventory. For open account and supply chain finance programmes, the Wolfsberg Principles list evasive behaviour by a party at onboarding and new regions, currencies or parties added after the initial set-up (Appendix IV).
Red Flags for Fund Managers and Lenders
Fund managers meet TBML risk through trade finance and private credit funds, and through portfolio companies that trade internationally. The published indicators translate into checks such as:
- A borrower or investee whose trade volumes, products or counterparties do not fit its stated business or its staff and premises.
- Receivables or inventory financed by the fund that are owed by, or held for, parties connected to the borrower.
- Late changes to the account that receives loan proceeds, or repayments from parties other than the borrower.
- Ownership through nominees or shell companies in high-risk jurisdictions, as in the FATF–Egmont structural indicators.
Our guide to KYC on private credit investors and borrowers covers borrower due diligence in more detail.
Single Indicators Are Not Conclusions
The analyst's task is to look for clusters across the customer's structure, the trade, the documents and the payments, record the reasoning, and decide whether the combination meets the firm's threshold for suspicion.
Escalation and Reporting
- Gather what you can see. Pull the customer profile, the documents held and the payment history. Note which indicators apply and which data you do not have.
- Ask commercial questions carefully. Seek an explanation for the inconsistency without disclosing a suspicion, which could amount to tipping off.
- Escalate to the MLRO. Record the indicators, the explanation and the decision.
- Report where suspicion is formed. Use the local route: a suspicious transaction report (STR) in Singapore and Hong Kong, a suspicious activity report (SAR) in the UK and the US.
- Re-rate the customer. Adjust the risk rating and monitoring, and decide whether the relationship should continue.
FinCEN asks US filers to include "TBML" or "BMPE" (black market peso exchange) in the narrative of relevant SARs (FIN-2010-A001), and the key term "CMLN-2025-A003" for SARs related to its 2025 advisory.
Detecting TBML in Practice
Detection combines several controls. Trade finance teams review documents at the transaction level. Customer due diligence teams apply closer scrutiny to customers with material trade exposure, at onboarding and at each review. Transaction monitoring applies scenarios to payment flows, such as payments from parties other than the buyer, round-tripping and sudden changes in trade volume or destination. Investigators bring alerts and documents together in one case.
See our guide to transaction monitoring for scenario design. An organisational step also helps: treating document review and payment monitoring as one workstream, so that each team sees what the other finds.
How One Constellation Supports TBML Controls
One Constellation is a software-as-a-service (SaaS) AML and know-your-customer (KYC) compliance platform headquartered in Singapore. It provides transaction monitoring, know-your-business (KYB) and ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) checks, sanctions, politically exposed person (PEP) and adverse-media screening, and case management with STR and SAR workflows.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is trade-based money laundering?
The FATF's 2006 study defines it as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimise their illicit origins. The aim is to move money, with the trade acting as cover.
What are the main red flags of TBML?
The FATF and Egmont Group group them into four categories: structural (such as shell companies or nominee owners), trade activity (trade that does not fit the business), trade documents and commodities (inconsistent or vague documents, illogical routing) and account and transaction activity (late payment changes, third-party payments, circular flows).
What are the four TBML techniques?
Over- and under-invoicing, over- and under-shipment of goods (including phantom shipments), multiple invoicing of the same shipment, and falsely described goods and services.
Is one red flag enough to file a report?
Not necessarily. The FATF–Egmont indicators say a single indicator may not alone warrant suspicion; MAS says a single red flag does not mean a transaction is illegal; and FinCEN says no one activity by itself is a clear indication of TBML. A report is made when the firm forms a suspicion, often from a combination of indicators and an unsatisfactory explanation.
Why is open account trade a TBML risk?
In open account trade, the bank processes a payment without seeing the trade documents, so it can usually apply only standard AML and sanctions screening. The Wolfsberg, ICC and BAFT Trade Finance Principles (2019) say open account trade accounts for approximately 80% of all international trade.
How should US firms label TBML in a SAR?
FinCEN asks filers to include "TBML" or "BMPE" in the SAR narrative for relevant reports, and the key term "CMLN-2025-A003" for reports linked to its August 2025 advisory on Chinese money laundering networks.
Sources
- FATF: Trade Based Money Laundering (2006), publication page
- FATF and Egmont Group: Trade-Based Money Laundering: Trends and Developments (December 2020)
- FATF and Egmont Group: Trade-Based Money Laundering: Risk Indicators (March 2021)
- Wolfsberg Group, ICC and BAFT: Trade Finance Principles (2019 amendment)
- FinCEN: Advisory FIN-2010-A001 on SAR filing regarding trade-based money laundering (18 February 2010, PDF)
- FinCEN: Advisory FIN-2025-A003 on Chinese money laundering networks (28 August 2025)
- MAS: Guidance on AML/CFT Controls in Trade Finance and Correspondent Banking (October 2015)
- ACIP: Best Practices for Countering Trade Based Money Laundering (May 2018, PDF)
- FCA: TR13/3 Banks' control of financial crime risks in trade finance (2013; marked historical)
This article is general information, not legal advice. Requirements change — check the current text with the regulator before relying on it.
Bring Trade Red Flags Into One Case
Transaction monitoring, KYB, screening and case management that keep alerts, documents and decisions together.
