Regulations

MAS Notice 626 Explained: AML/CFT Requirements and Guidelines for Singapore Banks

MAS Notice 626 is the binding AML/CFT instrument for banks in Singapore, and the Guidelines to MAS Notice 626 are the document MAS measures a bank's programme against. This guide covers the current text (dated 28 March 2024, last revised 30 June 2025), what the Guidelines add paragraph by paragraph, the customer due diligence, enhanced due diligence, reliance, reporting and record-keeping requirements, and what MAS examines.

Published: May 2026 Updated: 3 November 2026 Category: Regulations Read time: ~16 minutes
Quick Answer
MAS Notice 626 (Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Banks) is issued under section 16 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022 and applies to all banks in Singapore as defined in section 2 of the Banking Act 1970. The current Notice is dated 28 March 2024, took effect on 1 April 2024 and was last revised on 30 June 2025 with effect from 1 July 2025. It requires a documented enterprise-wide risk assessment, customer due diligence at onboarding and on an ongoing basis, enhanced due diligence for politically exposed persons and other higher-risk customers, strict conditions for reliance on third parties, screening, prompt suspicious transaction reports to STRO, records for at least 5 years, and internal controls including a compliance officer at management level, independent audit and training. The Guidelines to MAS Notice 626, dated 28 March 2024 and last revised on 1 July 2025, mirror the Notice's paragraph numbers and set out how MAS expects each requirement to be applied; the degree of observance of the Guidelines may affect MAS's overall risk assessment of the bank. The duty to report suspicion itself comes from section 45 of the CDSA.

Singapore's reputation as a financial centre rests on a supervisory regime that has steadily raised expectations on financial-crime controls. For banks, MAS Notice 626 is the operational expression of those expectations, and the Guidelines to the Notice are where MAS explains what a compliant programme looks like in practice. The Notice sets binding requirements; the Guidelines say how MAS expects them to be met, and MAS states that a bank's observance of the Guidelines can affect its overall supervisory risk assessment (Guidelines 1-3). Treating the Guidelines as optional is one of the more common ways a programme drifts out of supervisory expectation.

This article was rewritten on 3 November 2026 against the texts published on the MAS website on that date. It covers banks; parallel notices apply to other sectors, for example MAS Notice SFA04-N02 for capital markets intermediaries and MAS Notice PSN01 for payment service providers. For the wider Singapore framework and how the platform maps to it see our MAS compliance page.

Where MAS Notice 626 Stands in 2026

The table summarises the current position. Every entry comes from the Notice, the Guidelines or the MAS web pages for both documents.

QuestionPosition on 3 November 2026
Current text of the NoticeMAS Notice 626 dated 28 March 2024, in effect from 1 April 2024, last revised on 30 June 2025 by MAS Notice 626 (Amendment) 2025, in effect from 1 July 2025
Issuing powerSection 16 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022 (paragraph 1.1)
Who it applies toAll banks in Singapore as defined in section 2 of the Banking Act 1970 (paragraph 1.1)
Current GuidelinesGuidelines to MAS Notice 626 dated 28 March 2024, in effect from 1 April 2024, amended on 18 October 2024 and again with effect from 1 July 2025
What the 2025 amendment didMoney laundering now expressly includes proliferation financing throughout the Notice (footnote 1 to paragraph 2.1, footnote 3 to paragraph 4.1); the customer identification list in 6.6 was restructured for natural persons and for legal persons and arrangements (and 6.7 deleted); 6.14 was amended (the trust limb now refers to "trust relevant parties" and verification moved into new 6.14B) and new 6.14A to 6.14D set out the information to obtain on beneficial owners, verification, and a documented fallback for non-high-risk customers; the exclusions from the "third party" definition in 9.1 were widened from payment-services licensees to digital token service providers through new "Foreign FI" and "Entity X" definitions; 6.2 and 14.2 now require a copy of the STR to be extended to MAS upon request; Appendices 1 and 2 were updated
Main predicate legislationCorruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (CDSA): duty to disclose in section 45, tipping-off in section 57; Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act 2002 (TSOFA)

Version history. The Notice has been reissued twice and amended several times since 2007. The dates below are those listed on the MAS Notice 626 page.

DateEvent (MAS Notice 626 page)
2 July 2007MAS Notice 626 first issued
2 December 2009MAS Notice 626 (Amendment) 2009, dated 3 July 2009, takes effect
23 January 2013MAS Notice 626 (Amendment) 2013 takes effect
1 July 2014MAS Notice 626 (Amendment) 2014 takes effect
24 May 2015New MAS Notice 626 dated 24 April 2015 takes effect (paragraphs 4, 5, 15.6 and 15.7 from 24 July 2015); the 2007 Notice is cancelled
30 November 2015MAS Notice 626 (Amendment) 2015 takes effect
28 June 2021MAS Notice 626 (Amendment) 2021 takes effect
1 March 2022MAS Notice 626 Amendment 2022 takes effect
1 April 2024New MAS Notice 626 dated 28 March 2024 takes effect; the 2015 Notice (last revised 1 March 2022) is cancelled
1 July 2025MAS Notice 626 (Amendment) dated 30 June 2025 takes effect

Who MAS Notice 626 Applies To

Paragraph 1.1 is short: the Notice "applies to all banks in Singapore, as defined in section 2 of the Banking Act 1970". A Singapore-incorporated bank and the Singapore branch of a foreign bank are both in scope, with one difference: the group-policy requirements in paragraphs 15.3 to 15.9 apply to banks incorporated in Singapore, while a Singapore branch of a foreign bank must share customer, account and transaction information within its financial group for risk management purposes under paragraph 15.9A (Guidelines 15-2-1).

The Notice draws on the FATF Recommendations, which is why its structure is familiar to anyone who has worked under another FATF-aligned regime. Three underlying principles in paragraph 3 frame everything that follows: due diligence towards customers, persons acting on their behalf, connected parties and beneficial owners; conducting business to high ethical standards and guarding against any relationship or transaction, including a digital token transaction, that may facilitate money laundering or terrorism financing; and assisting law enforcement to the fullest extent possible.

Structure of the Notice

The Notice is organised by obligation area. The paragraph numbers matter because the Guidelines use the same numbering.

ParagraphSubjectWhat it does
1 to 3Introduction, definitions, underlying principlesScope (all banks in Singapore), defined terms such as beneficial owner, connected party and business relations, and the three principles: due diligence, high ethical standards, cooperation with law enforcement
4 and 5Risk assessment and risk-based approach; new products, practices and technologiesIdentify, assess and understand ML/TF (including proliferation financing) risks across customers, countries, products, services, transactions and delivery channels; document, keep up to date and be able to provide the assessment to MAS; assess new products and technologies before launch
6Customer due diligenceNo anonymous accounts; when CDD is due; identification and verification of the customer, persons acting on its behalf, connected parties and beneficial owners; ongoing monitoring; non-face-to-face relations; non-account holders; timing of verification; screening (6.39 to 6.43)
7 and 8Simplified and enhanced customer due diligenceSimplified measures where risk is assessed as low; enhanced measures for politically exposed persons, their family members and close associates, and for other higher-risk customers
9Reliance on third partiesWho may be relied on, the four conditions, no reliance for ongoing monitoring, and the bank remains responsible
10, 11 and 11ACorrespondent banking; wire transfers; value transfersDue diligence on respondent institutions; originator and beneficiary information for wire transfers and for digital token value transfers
12 and 13Record keeping; personal dataRecords that allow transactions to be reconstructed; at least 5 years; what personal data rights apply
14Suspicious transactions reportingA single internal reference point, prompt STRs to STRO regardless of amount including attempted transactions, documented decisions, and stopping CDD where it would tip off
15Internal policies, compliance, audit and trainingPolicies approved and communicated; group policy for banks incorporated in Singapore; an AML/CFT compliance officer at management level; independent audit; employee screening; training
Appendices 1 and 2Financial institutionsThe MAS-regulated institutions that count for the beneficial-owner exemption in 6.16 (Appendix 1) and for third-party reliance in 9.1 (Appendix 2)

The Guidelines to MAS Notice 626: What They Are and How MAS Uses Them

The Guidelines to MAS Notice 626 on Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism are dated 28 March 2024, took effect with the Notice on 1 April 2024, and have been amended twice, on 18 October 2024 and on 1 July 2025. Previous versions dated 2 December 2009 and 24 April 2015 are cancelled. Three features matter for how a bank should read them.

  • They track the Notice paragraph by paragraph. Chapter 2 of the Guidelines deals with paragraph 2 of the Notice, chapter 6 with paragraph 6, and so on; not every Notice paragraph has a corresponding chapter. Part I at the end adds guidance on proliferation financing and Appendices A and B give examples of CDD information for customers, including legal persons and arrangements, and examples of suspicious transactions.
  • They are not optional in practice. Paragraph 1-3: "The degree of observance with these Guidelines by a bank may have an impact on the Authority's overall risk assessment of the bank, including the quality of its board and senior management oversight, governance, internal controls and risk management."
  • They start with accountability. Paragraphs 1-4-7 and 1-4-8 place ultimate responsibility for AML/CFT compliance with the board of directors and senior management, who may delegate tasks to senior AML/CFT employees but not final accountability. Paragraphs 1-4-9 to 1-4-12 set out the three lines of defence: business units, the AML/CFT compliance function with other support functions, and internal audit, with a list of what periodic AML/CFT internal audits should cover.

Chapter 2 also answers scoping questions that come up in practice, for example that where a bank's customer is a portfolio manager operating an account in that capacity, the underlying investors are beneficial owners within the meaning of the Notice, and the bank should evaluate the risks in each case and determine the appropriate CDD measures, and may consider simplified measures under paragraph 7, unless the customer falls within the paragraph 6.16 exemption (Guidelines 2-3(a)). For fund managers and administrators on the other side of that relationship, see our guide to MAS Notice SFA04-N02.

Notice and Guidelines Side by Side

The table pairs each main requirement in the Notice with the operational detail the Guidelines add. Paragraph references in the right-hand column are to the Guidelines (hyphenated numbers) and in the middle column to the Notice.

Notice paragraphThe Notice requiresThe Guidelines add (paragraph numbers in the Guidelines)
4 Risk assessmentAn assessment of ML/TF risks across customers, countries, products, services, transactions and delivery channels, documented, kept up to date and available to MAS (4.1 and 4.2); risk mitigation policies approved by senior management (4.3)An enterprise-wide risk assessment consolidated across business units, product lines and channels, approved by senior management (4-3 to 4-5); the factors to weigh (4-6); both qualitative and quantitative analysis (4-8); Singapore's national risk assessment reports incorporated (4-11); a review at least once every two years or on a material trigger event, documented and approved even where nothing changed (4-18)
6 Customer due diligenceCDD when business relations are established, for transactions above S$20,000 or cross-border wire transfers above S$1,500 for non-account holders, on suspicion, or on doubts about earlier information (6.3); identification data lists (6.6, 6.8, 6.10, 6.14A); verification from reliable, independent sources (6.9); beneficial owners identified through a cascade of ownership, control and executive authority (6.14)The cascade is sequential, not a menu (6-8-1); ownership may be assessed against a threshold such as more than 25 per cent, with aggregation for cross-shareholdings (6-8-2); a controller below the threshold is still a beneficial owner (6-8-3); a customer declaration does not discharge the duty to take reasonable measures to verify (6-8-4); listed companies and their majority-owned subsidiaries need no beneficial-owner identification, subject to the more-than-25-per-cent test for other non-listed owners (6-8-7 to 6-8-9); foreign-language documents translated by a qualified translator or independent staff (6-6-7)
6 Ongoing monitoringMonitor business relations on an ongoing basis, scrutinise transactions against the bank's knowledge of the customer, pay special attention to complex, unusually large or unusual patterns, document enquiries, keep CDD up to date, and apply enhanced measures where a suspected customer is retained (6.19 to 6.26)Updated CDD for higher-risk customers at periodic review or on a trigger event, whichever is earlier, and for others on a trigger event (6-10-4); trigger events listed (6-10-5); more frequent periodic review for higher-risk customers, for example annually (6-10-6); monitoring parameters and thresholds documented and independently validated (6-10-12); holistic monitoring across accounts and business units (6-10-10 and 6-10-11)
6 ScreeningScreen the customer, persons acting on its behalf, connected parties and beneficial owners at onboarding, periodically, on list changes and on changes to those persons, and all wire and value transfer originators and beneficiaries; document the results (6.39 to 6.42)All identified parties are screened regardless of risk profile (6-15-1); a positive sanctions hit means freezing without delay and an STR as soon as possible and no later than one business day after suspicion is established (6-15-2); written policies on sources, roles, frequency and alert resolution (6-15-3); fuzzy matching calibrated to the business (6-15-4)
7 Simplified CDDSimplified measures only where the bank is satisfied, on an analysis of risk, that the risks are low; documented (paragraph 7)Ongoing monitoring still applies (7-2); examples of simplified measures (7-4) and of potentially lower-risk situations such as Singapore Government entities, listed companies with transparency requirements and FATF-standard supervised foreign institutions (7-5)
8 Enhanced CDDSystems to identify PEPs, family members and close associates (8.2); for them, senior management approval, source of wealth and source of funds, and enhanced monitoring (8.3); a risk-based approach for domestic and international-organisation PEPs and for PEPs who have stepped down (8.4); other higher-risk categories including FATF countermeasure countries and opaque legal persons (8.5 to 8.7)Domestic PEPs include at least Government Ministers, Members of Parliament, Nominated and Non-Constituency Members (8-4-2); commercial databases are acceptable but occupation and employer should also be obtained (8-5-2); source of wealth and source of funds defined and distinguished (8-5-5 and 8-5-6), corroborated from reliable, independent sources with a documented basis for any assumptions or benchmarks (8-5-7); residual-risk assessment where corroboration is not possible (8-5-7A); gifts from third parties examined (8-5-7B); time since stepping down is relevant but not the sole factor, with seniority and any link between the former and current roles also weighed (8-5-11); shell-company indicators (8-2)
9 Reliance on third partiesReliance only on Appendix 2 institutions, FATF-standard supervised foreign institutions or group entities, subject to four conditions; no reliance for ongoing monitoring; documentation and immediate receipt of CDD information; the bank remains responsible (9.1 to 9.5)Reliance is not outsourcing: an outsourced provider works to the bank's policies and controls, a relied-on third party to its own (9-1 to 9-3); ways to satisfy the conditions, from FATF and IMF assessments to reviewing the third party's policies (9-4); a five-year retention undertaking where the third party holds the documents (9-5); syndicated facilities (9-6); first-level alert review or sanctions reviews may be outsourced, with the bank still responsible (9-8)
12 Record keepingRecords of all CDD data and transactions, sufficient to reconstruct any transaction; at least 5 years after the end of business relations or completion of the transaction; longer where STRO or another authority requires (12.1 to 12.5)Banks participating in COSMIC must also meet the record-keeping obligations of MAS Notice FSM-N02 (12-1)
14 Suspicious transactions reportingA single internal reference point; prompt STRs to STRO regardless of amount, including attempted transactions, with a copy to MAS on request; documented determinations including where CDD cannot be completed or the customer withdraws; CDD may be stopped where it would tip off (14.1 to 14.4)The internal evaluation completed without delay and the STR filed no later than 5 business days after suspicion is first established, save in exceptional circumstances; 1 business day where sanctioned parties are involved (14-1); processes to prioritise and escalate higher-risk concerns before suspicion crystallises (14-A); decisions not to file substantiated and documented (14-6); further or supplementary STRs where new suspicion arises (14-4); an STR to STRO also meets the TSOFA reporting obligation (14-2)
15 Internal policies, compliance, audit and trainingAdequate policies communicated to employees; group policy for banks incorporated in Singapore with the higher standard applied abroad; an AML/CFT compliance officer at management level with adequate resources; an independent, adequately resourced audit function; employee screening; regular training (15.1 to 15.14)Board and senior management hold final accountability and set the tone; three lines of defence (1-4-7 to 1-4-12); the compliance officer's responsibilities, including reporting to senior management and, for locally incorporated banks, to the board at least annually (15-3-2); independence from audit and business lines (15-3-3); bank-wide periodic audits (15-4); hiring checks with past employers, screening sources and bankruptcy searches, plus risk-based credit checks (15-5); refresher training at least once every two years with records kept (15-6-2)

Customer Due Diligence Requirements

Paragraph 6 is the longest part of the Notice. The points below are the ones that most often decide whether a file passes inspection.

  • When CDD is due (6.3). On establishing business relations; on a transaction above S$20,000, or any digital token transaction, for a customer without business relations; on a domestic wire transfer, or a cross-border wire transfer above S$1,500, or any value transfer of digital tokens, for such a customer; on suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing; and on doubts about the veracity or adequacy of earlier information. Linked or structured transactions are aggregated (6.4).
  • Identification (6.6, 6.8, 6.10). For a natural person: full name and aliases, unique identification number, residential address, date of birth and nationality. For a legal person or arrangement: full name, registration or tax number, registered or business address and principal place of business, date and place of incorporation or registration, trust deed if any, purpose, place of administration, and legal form, constitution and powers. Connected parties (directors and persons with executive authority, partners or managers, and equivalent persons in legal arrangements) are identified by name and identification number, with a documented fallback to date of birth and nationality for non-high-risk customers (6.8A and 6.8B). Natural persons appointed to act for the customer are identified, verified and their authority verified (6.10 and 6.11).
  • Verification (6.9). Reliable, independent source data, documents or information; for legal persons and arrangements, verification of legal form, proof of existence, constitution and powers. The Guidelines expect clear, legible documents and translations of foreign-language documents by a qualified translator or independent staff (6-6-7 and 6-6-8).
  • Beneficial owners (6.13 to 6.17). Inquire whether any beneficial owner exists; identify, for legal persons, the natural persons who ultimately own the customer, then those who ultimately control it, then those with executive authority, in that order (6.14 and Guidelines 6-8-1); for trusts, the trust relevant parties and anyone exercising ultimate ownership or control through any chain. Verification uses reliable, independent sources. No inquiry is needed for entities listed on the Singapore Exchange or a foreign exchange with adequate transparency requirements, Appendix 1 financial institutions, FATF-standard supervised foreign institutions, or investment vehicles managed by such institutions, unless there are doubts or suspicion (6.16), with the basis documented for the foreign cases (6.17). Footnote 6 reminds a bank that manages an investment vehicle as primary manager that the exemption does not apply to it unless the interests are distributed by a qualifying financial institution. See our look-through approach entry for how that works in practice.
  • Non-face-to-face and timing (6.27 to 6.34). Policies for non-face-to-face relations, with CDD at least as robust as face-to-face; verification is normally completed before business relations are established or a transaction is undertaken, with limited exceptions in 6.33 and 6.34.
  • Screening (6.39 to 6.42). Screen the customer, persons acting on its behalf, connected parties and beneficial owners against ML/TF information sources and lists provided by MAS and other relevant authorities, at onboarding, for non-account-holder transactions, periodically, on list changes and on changes to those persons, and screen all wire and value transfer originators and beneficiaries; document the results.

MAS expects CDD to be a substantive exercise. The Guidelines are explicit that a customer's declaration about its beneficial owners does not discharge the bank's duty to take reasonable measures to verify them (6-8-4), and that complex ownership structures call for enough information to understand whether there is a legitimate reason for them (6-8-5). A KYC platform should therefore support validation and reconciliation, not only collection.

Enhanced Due Diligence Triggers

Paragraph 8 makes enhanced CDD mandatory in defined cases and risk-based in others.

  • Politically exposed persons (8.1 to 8.4). A bank must have systems to determine whether a customer, a person acting on its behalf, a connected party or a beneficial owner is a PEP, a family member or a close associate. Where a customer or beneficial owner is one, the bank must obtain senior management approval to establish or continue the relationship, establish source of wealth and source of funds by appropriate and reasonable means, and conduct enhanced monitoring (8.3). A risk-based approach may be taken for domestic PEPs, international-organisation PEPs and PEPs who have stepped down, unless the relationship presents higher risk (8.4). The Guidelines add that domestic PEPs include at least all Government Ministers and Members of Parliament (8-4-2), that commercial databases are acceptable alongside the customer's own occupation and employer details (8-5-2), and that the time since a PEP stepped down is relevant but not the sole factor; seniority and any link between the former and current roles must also be weighed (8-5-11).
  • Other higher-risk categories (8.5 to 8.7). Customers or beneficial owners from countries subject to FATF countermeasures are higher risk by definition; customers from countries known to have inadequate AML/CFT measures, and legal persons with no apparent operations, no economic purpose for their structure or no substantive financial activity, must be assessed; enhanced measures then apply to anyone the bank, MAS or another relevant authority identifies as higher risk. Guidelines 8-2 list further indicators, including unusual or excessively complex ownership structures, personal asset-holding vehicles, nominee shareholders or bearer shares, cash-intensive businesses, and shell-company characteristics such as no business presence in Singapore, shared addresses or superficial websites.
  • Source of wealth and funds. The Guidelines define source of wealth as the origin of the entire body of wealth and source of funds as the origin of the particular funds in the relationship (8-5-5 and 8-5-6), list the documents that count as appropriate and reasonable means, from tax returns and audited accounts to conveyancing documents (8-5-7), and require a documented residual-risk assessment where corroboration is not possible (8-5-7A). See our guide to source of funds versus source of wealth.

Reliance on Third Parties and Outsourcing

Paragraph 9 permits a bank to rely on a third party to perform the CDD measures in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 only where the third party is an Appendix 2 financial institution, a foreign financial institution supervised for compliance with FATF-consistent requirements, or a branch, subsidiary, parent, head office or related corporation of the bank, in each case other than an entity holding only a payment services or digital token service provider licence (a "Foreign FI" or "Entity X") (9.1), and only if the bank is satisfied about the third party's supervision and controls, has assessed the country risk, confirms MAS has not precluded that third party, and can obtain the CDD data, documents and information without delay (9.2). The bank must document that basis, except for Appendix 2 institutions, and immediately obtain the CDD information (9.4). No third party may be relied on for ongoing monitoring (9.3), and the bank "shall remain responsible for its AML/CFT obligations" (9.5).

The Guidelines draw the line that matters operationally: paragraph 9 "does not apply to outsourcing" (9-1). A relied-on third party has its own relationship with the customer and applies its own policies; an outsourced provider performs the measures on the bank's behalf, under the bank's policies and control measures (9-2 and 9-3). A bank may therefore outsource the first-level review of transaction monitoring alerts or sanctions reviews, including to group entities, while remaining responsible for the ongoing monitoring requirement (9-8). Where documents are held by a third party, the bank should obtain an undertaking to keep them for at least five years after the relationship ends (9-5).

Suspicious Transaction Reporting and Record Keeping

  • The statutory duty. Section 45(1) of the CDSA requires a person who knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that property represents the proceeds of, was used in connection with, or is intended to be used in connection with drug dealing or criminal conduct, where the information came to them in the course of their trade, profession, business or employment, to disclose it to a Suspicious Transaction Reporting Officer "as soon as is reasonably practicable". Section 45(2) makes clear the duty applies whether or not the transaction was completed. Section 57 creates the tipping-off offences.
  • What the Notice adds. Paragraph 14.1 requires a single reference point to whom all employees refer suspected transactions and records of everything referred to STRO with the internal analysis; 14.2 requires prompt reports regardless of amount, including attempted transactions, with a copy to MAS on request; 14.3 requires a documented determination where CDD cannot be completed or where a customer is reluctant to provide information or withdraws; 14.4 allows the bank to stop CDD where performing it would tip off the customer, document the basis and file an STR.
  • The timing the Guidelines expect. Paragraph 14-1 of the Guidelines: the internal evaluation should be completed without delay and "the filing of an STR should not exceed 5 business days after suspicion was first established, unless the circumstances are exceptional or extraordinary"; where sanctioned parties or persons acting for them are involved, "as soon as possible, and no later than 1 business day". The point in time is when the bank concludes, on the available information and its investigations, that filing is warranted (footnotes 14 and 17).
  • After filing. Guidelines 14-4: take action to mitigate the risk, which may include reviewing the customer's risk classification or the relationship, escalate as appropriate, and assess whether a further or supplementary STR is warranted if new suspicion arises. Guidelines 14-6: document every transaction brought to the compliance function's attention, including those not reported, and substantiate the basis for not filing.
  • Records. Paragraph 12.3 of the Notice: CDD information, account files, business correspondence and the results of any analysis for at least 5 years after the end of business relations or completion of the transaction, and transaction records for at least 5 years after completion; records on matters under investigation or that were the subject of an STR for as long as STRO or another authority requires (12.5). Records may be originals or copies, paper, electronic or microfilm, provided they are admissible in a Singapore court (12.4).

What MAS Inspects

The Notice and the Guidelines together tell a compliance team what evidence to have ready. The following areas are where the documents themselves set the yardstick.

  • The risk assessment and its documentation. Guidelines 4-16 and 4-17 list what the documentation should include (the assessment itself, how controls follow from it, the reports to senior management and the review frequency) and require it to be available to MAS on request. A generic assessment that does not reflect the bank's own customer base, products and channels is the first thing an inspector will test.
  • CDD file substance. The Notice requires verification from reliable, independent sources (6.9) and reasonable measures to verify beneficial owners; the Guidelines say a declaration from the customer does not discharge that duty (6-8-4), that documents must be clear, legible and, where necessary, translated (6-6-7 and 6-6-8), and that source of wealth and funds for PEPs and other higher-risk customers must be corroborated with a documented basis (8-5-7). Expect sampled files across risk tiers to be read against those standards.
  • Monitoring calibration. Guidelines 6-10-12: parameters and thresholds "should be properly documented and independently validated" and periodically reviewed. Guidelines 6-10-8 accept that systems range from spreadsheets to automated platforms, but 6-10-9 requires them to give the business and compliance timely information to identify and analyse suspicious activity.
  • STR timeliness and decisions not to file. The 5-business-day and 1-business-day expectations in 14-1, and the documentation of non-filing decisions in 14-6, give inspectors a clear yardstick.
  • Screening operations. Guidelines 6-15-3 require written policies covering the sources screened, roles, frequency, alert resolution and reporting of positive hits; 6-15-4 requires awareness of the shortcomings of automated screening and calibrated fuzzy matching; 6-15-5 warns that screening only after onboarding can itself breach sanctions law.
  • Governance. Guidelines 1-3 state that the degree of observance of the Guidelines "may have an impact on the Authority's overall risk assessment of the bank", including the quality of board and senior management oversight. Guidelines 15-3-1 to 15-3-3 require a compliance officer with seniority, authority and independence, reporting at least annually to the board of a locally incorporated bank; 15-4 requires bank-wide periodic audits.

A Practical Compliance Checklist

Translating the Notice into an operating programme comes down to a manageable set of recurring activities.

  • Maintain a current enterprise-wide risk assessment. Document exposure across customers, products, channels and geographies, incorporate the national risk assessments, obtain senior management approval, and review at least every two years or on a trigger event (Guidelines 4-3 to 4-18). Everything downstream should trace back to it.
  • Calibrate monitoring to that assessment. Map typologies to detection logic, document and independently validate thresholds (6-10-12), and review them periodically against outcomes.
  • Keep CDD live. Periodic reviews on a risk-based schedule, annual for higher-risk customers as the Guidelines suggest (6-10-6), plus trigger-based reviews (6-10-5), with screening repeated on list changes and changes to connected parties and beneficial owners (6.40).
  • Resource alert handling realistically. Record the reasoning behind every closure and escalation (14-6), and make sure analysts have access to the CDD information they need to resolve fuzzy-match alerts (6-15-4).
  • File STRs promptly and track the timeline. Measure the interval from established suspicion to filing against the 5-business-day and 1-business-day expectations (14-1) and treat persistent delay as a control issue.
  • Make records retrievable, not just retained. Confirm that five years of CDD, transaction and STR documentation can be produced within the time an authority sets (12.2(d)).
  • Keep governance evidenced. Board-approved policies, a compliance officer with seniority and independence, bank-wide audit coverage, hiring checks and refresher training at least every two years with records (15-5 and 15-6).

For a paragraph-by-paragraph version you can work through, see our Singapore AML/CFT compliance checklist. For transaction monitoring in depth, see our guides on rule tuning and alert triage workflows.

Common Failure Points

The same weaknesses recur across programmes that struggle under inspection:

  • Policy without practice. A comprehensive manual that the day-to-day operation does not follow. MAS tests the operation, not the manual.
  • Uniform monitoring. One rule set applied across the whole customer base, producing noise on high-volume customers and silence on the ones whose behaviour has genuinely shifted.
  • Alert backlogs. Volume outrunning capacity, leading to rushed closures and STRs filed beyond the 5-business-day expectation.
  • Stale CDD. Customer information that was accurate at onboarding and never refreshed, so the risk rating no longer reflects reality.
  • Declarations treated as verification. Beneficial-owner declarations and source-of-wealth statements accepted without the corroboration the Guidelines describe.
  • Weak audit trail. Decisions recorded as outcomes without the reasoning, leaving nothing for an inspector to assess.

Each of these is a practice failure rather than a documentation gap, which is why they survive in programmes that look complete on paper. For comparison with other regimes see our guides to the UK Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and 6AMLD.

How One Constellation Supports Notice 626 Compliance

One Constellation's AML/CFT platform supports the operational evidence MAS inspects against: customer due diligence with identity verification and KYB, beneficial ownership tracing across layered structures, sanctions, PEP and adverse media screening at onboarding and on a periodic basis, risk rating with enhanced due diligence workflows and senior management approvals, transaction monitoring with documented rule parameters, and case management with STR workflows that record the reasoning behind every decision. The platform is delivered as SaaS from our Singapore headquarters and One Constellation holds ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type II certifications.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is MAS Notice 626?

MAS Notice 626 is the Monetary Authority of Singapore's notice on Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism for banks. It is issued under section 16 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022, applies to all banks in Singapore as defined in section 2 of the Banking Act 1970, and sets binding requirements on risk assessment, customer due diligence, enhanced due diligence, reliance on third parties, correspondent banking, wire and value transfers, record keeping, suspicious transaction reporting and internal controls. The current Notice is dated 28 March 2024 and was last revised on 30 June 2025, with effect from 1 July 2025.

Are the Guidelines to MAS Notice 626 legally binding?

The Notice sets the binding requirements; the Guidelines provide guidance on how MAS expects them to be met and should be read with the Notice. MAS states in paragraph 1-3 of the Guidelines that the degree of a bank's observance of the Guidelines may affect MAS's overall risk assessment of the bank, including the quality of board and senior management oversight, governance, internal controls and risk management. In practice they define the standard MAS examines against.

What changed in MAS Notice 626 on 1 July 2025?

MAS Notice 626 (Amendment) 2025, dated 30 June 2025, made money laundering expressly include proliferation financing throughout the Notice, restructured the customer identification requirements in paragraph 6.6 into separate lists for natural persons and for legal persons and arrangements, amended paragraph 6.14 (the trust limb now refers to trust relevant parties and verification moved into new paragraph 6.14B) and added paragraphs 6.14A to 6.14D on the information to obtain on beneficial owners, verification and a documented fallback for non-high-risk customers, widened the exclusions from the third-party definition in paragraph 9.1 from payment-services licensees to digital token service providers through new Foreign FI and Entity X definitions, changed paragraphs 6.2 and 14.2 so that a copy of the STR goes to MAS upon request, and updated Appendices 1 and 2. The Guidelines were amended on the same date.

How quickly must a Singapore bank file a suspicious transaction report?

Section 45 of the CDSA requires disclosure to a Suspicious Transaction Reporting Officer as soon as is reasonably practicable, and paragraph 14.2 of the Notice requires prompt reports regardless of amount, including attempted transactions. The Guidelines set the expectation: the internal evaluation completed without delay and the STR filed no later than 5 business days after suspicion was first established, unless the circumstances are exceptional or extraordinary, and no later than 1 business day where sanctioned parties or persons acting for them are involved.

When does MAS Notice 626 require customer due diligence for a one-off transaction?

Under paragraph 6.3, a bank must perform CDD for a customer without business relations when it undertakes a transaction above S$20,000, any digital token transaction, a domestic wire transfer or a cross-border wire transfer above S$1,500, or any value transfer of digital tokens. Transactions that appear linked or deliberately split are aggregated under paragraph 6.4. The bank must also perform CDD whenever it suspects money laundering or terrorism financing or doubts earlier information.

How long must records be kept under MAS Notice 626?

At least 5 years after the end of business relations or the completion of a wire transfer, value transfer or non-account transaction for CDD information, account files, business correspondence and analysis, and at least 5 years after completion for transaction records (paragraph 12.3). Records relating to matters under investigation or the subject of an STR must be kept for as long as STRO or another relevant authority requires (paragraph 12.5).

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